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Abstract 
 
Through the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the federal government 
established Title I funding to target resources for districts serving low-income students. The 
reauthorization of ESEA in 2001 expanded the program’s funding significantly, making Title I 
the largest federal education finance program aimed at improving the achievement of low-
income students, yet the impact of this funding on disadvantaged students is still heavily debated. 
Determining the causal impact of Title I funding on district spending and student learning is 
difficult because the poverty counts at the center of the funding formula are also correlated with 
these outcomes. This study exploits the fact that changes in federal student poverty counts due to 
the 2010 Census, which are unrelated to actual changes in district poverty levels during that same 
time period, led to significant changes in Title I allocations across districts. I exploit these 
changes in funding to implement an instrumental variables research design to determine the 
causal effect of sudden changes in Title I funding on Ohio school districts. This paper finds that 
sudden changes in Title I allocations increase total, state, and federal revenue initially, but in the 
long-run a local offsetting response subsequently results in a negative effect for instructional 
expenditures. The results suggest that Title I has little to no effect on student achievement.   
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I. Introduction 
 The passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) represents the 
most comprehensive federal legislation for education during the 20th century. The act established 
Title I funding to provide resources for school districts serving high proportions of 
disadvantaged students. Around the same time, the U.S. Department of Education released “The 
Coleman Report”, a study on the equality of educational opportunity in the United States. The 
report found that school funding had little impact on student achievement (Coleman, 1966), a 
controversial finding that has sparked debate about the effectiveness of school finance 
equalization for decades.  
 The reauthorization of Title I through No Child Left Behind established four distribution 
formulas for the program: the Basic Grant, Concentration Grant, Targeted Assistance Grant, and 
Education Finance Incentive Grant. Each grant has a unique mechanism of distribution. The 
Basic Grant provides funding to school districts based on the number of students in poverty and 
accounted for 45% of Title I funding for a total of $6.4 billion in Fiscal Year 2014 (FY 14). The 
Concentration Grant provides funding to districts with over 15 percent of students in poverty or 
greater than 6,500 poor children. Approximately 9 percent of Title I funding and $1.4 billion was 
distributed through the Concentration Grant in FY 14. The Targeted Assistance formula provides 
increasingly more funding per student as the poverty rate increases across districts. The 
Education Finance Incentive Grant rewards some states for spending their funds wisely while 
targeting funds to districts in states that spend inequitably. The Targeted Assistance and 
Education Finance Incentive Grants each accounted for 23 percent of Title I funding and $3.3 
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billion in FY 14. With over $14.4 billion in funding provided through Title I in FY 14, the 
program represents the most significant federal effort to aid low-income students.1  
The most recent reauthorization of ESEA occurred in December of 2015 with the passage 
of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). This new federal education legislation has reignited 
the discussion on how to most effectively target Title I funds for the benefit of low-income 
students. In concurrence with ESSA returning greater power and authority over K-12 education 
to the states, the law also increases states’ discretion over how Title I funds are used and 
broadens the scope of initiatives for which schools can target their resources. Districts also have 
to show that Title I supplements state and local spending, ensuring that funds received from the 
federal government do not simply supplant funds from lower levels of government.2 Title I is 
unlikely to have its intended effect if state and local governments simply reduce their allocations 
for education in response to the receipt of Title I funds.  
The analysis of the program’s impact on student achievement also has larger implications 
for states seeking to implement school finance reforms that result in greater funding equity for 
low-income districts. The state of Ohio, along with many others, has faced several lawsuits from 
plaintiffs arguing that the state’s school finance formula does not provide for a “thorough and 
efficient system of common schools.” The state’s school funding formula has been ruled 
unconstitutional four times, and Ohio has pursued a weighted student funding formula in an 
effort to address the problem.3 Weighted funding formulas are intended to provide targeted funds 
to students based on their needs. Districts whose students are considered more expensive to 
                                                          
1 “No Child Left Behind – Title I Distribution Formulas”. (2014, April 24). New America Foundation. Retrieved 
from http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-act-title-i-distribution-formulas.  
2 Ujifusa, Andrew. “Funding Flexibility Enhanced Under New K-12 Law”. (2016, January 5). Education Week. 
Retrieved from http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/01/06/funding-flexibility-enhanced-under-new-k-12-
law.html.  
3 “Your Guide to the Ups and Downs of School Funding in Ohio”. (2013, January 28). NPR StateImpact. Retrieved 
from http://stateimpact.npr.org/ohio/2013/01/28/your-guide-to-the-ups-and-downs-of-school-funding-in-ohio/.  
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educate receive more state funding. Analyzing the impact of Title I funding on student 
achievement may shed light on whether pursuing more equitable finance systems will lead to 
improved student outcomes.  
Although countless studies have been completed in an effort to determine the relationship 
between school funding and student performance, there is still no consensus among academics 
on this controversial topic. Many past studies have suffered from endogeneity biases because 
funding levels are often correlated with other factors, such as poverty, that also have a dramatic 
effect on student achievement. In this paper, I employ a quasi-experimental research design to 
address the endogeneity problem and I take advantage of the unique nature of the Title I 
allocation formulas that generated a sudden shift in funding in the 2012-13 school year (FY 13). 
Sudden shifts in poverty counts generated by decennial updating of the U.S. Census 
subsequently drive exogenous changes in Title I funding. I employ a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) research design to estimate the causal effect of exogenous 
changes in Title I funding on district spending and academic performance in Ohio.  My analysis 
sheds light on whether sudden increases in Title I funds result in future offsetting responses from 
state and local governments. Furthermore, my analysis on the impact of Title I on student 
achievement reveals the potential effectiveness of increasing flexibility in how money is spent 
through mechanisms such as weighted student funding formulas.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I review research linking school 
funding and student outcomes as well as research on intergovernmental grants, including Title I 
of ESEA. Section III provides an overview of my data and methodology. In Section IV, I discuss 
my results and Section V offers concluding remarks.  
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II. Literature Review  
A. School Funding and Student Outcomes 
The impact of funding on student outcomes has been a heavily debated topic in education 
policy for decades. Hundreds of studies have utilized education production functions to estimate 
the relationship between school inputs, such as teacher salary and teacher-pupil ratios, and 
school outputs in the form of student test scores or graduation rates. Through a meta-analysis of 
nearly 400 studies, Hanushek (1996) determined that there was not a strong or consistent 
relationship between student performance and school resources. This finding may seem 
counterintuitive, but Hoxby (1996) argues that teachers’ unions lobby for increased school inputs 
while negatively impacting student performance. Although Hoxby’s study may provide a 
plausible explanation of perverse incentives in the education system, the relationship between 
resources and achievement is far from a settled question.  Another comprehensive meta-analysis 
(Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996) found that a broad range of resources had a substantial 
positive correlation with academic outcomes. The authors claim that moderate increases in 
spending are likely to lead to significant increases in academic achievement. However, because 
of limitations of the research design in studies using education production functions, the causal 
relationship between expenditures and student outcomes has largely eluded researchers until 
recently.  
Many studies linking resources and achievement suffer from endogeneity biases and fail 
to estimate the true causal effect of funding on academic outcomes, but recent studies have 
employed more advanced research methodologies in an effort to estimate the causal effect of 
school funding on student outcomes. Researchers have utilized quasi-experimental research 
designs including IV techniques, regression discontinuity, and many others in an effort to answer 
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this question. The results of several more recent studies, which use newer methodologies and 
evaluate the impact of school finance reforms seeking to create more equitable and adequate 
levels of funding, appear to challenge Hanushek’s findings (1996).  
Jackson, Johnson, and Persico’s recent study (2014) estimates the effect of changes in 
school funding driven by court-mandated school finance reforms on fiscal, academic, and 
economic outcomes. Utilizing a comprehensive database on school finance reforms from 1967-
2010, the authors assess the impact of various reforms on low and high-income school districts. 
The reforms have played a key role in equalizing spending among these types of districts by 
increasing spending in low-income districts. The authors used an IV-2SLS research design based 
on the timing and intensity of court-mandated school finance reforms. They found that the 
effects of a 20 percent increase in per-pupil spending each year for all 12 years of public school 
for children from poor families are large enough to eliminate most of the gaps in the adult 
outcomes between those raised in poor families and those raised in higher income families.  
Card and Payne (2002) also found promising results for school finance equalization 
advocates. The authors found that court-mandated school finance reforms led to increases in 
funding available for lower-income districts, which subsequently resulted in a $0.30-0.65 
increase in overall spending for each additional dollar in state aid that was received. Equalization 
of spending also led to a modest equalizing effect on test score outcomes between students 
whose parents come from higher and lesser educated backgrounds. Another study by Guryan 
(2001) assessed the impact of a major school finance equalization scheme on student 
achievement in Massachusetts. Exploiting discontinuities in the staid aid formulas of the 
Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993, Guryan found that increased funding had positive 
impacts on some student test score outcomes.  
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Two studies found positive attainment and test outcomes as a result of a school finance 
reform in Michigan. Hyman (2013) employed an IV-2SLS research design to estimate the effect 
of Michigan’s Proposal A on long-run educational attainment. The author found that increasing 
spending led to higher rates of college entry and postsecondary degree completion, but benefits 
were primarily concentrated among non-poor students. Roy (2003) performed a similar analysis 
on Proposal A in Michigan to assess the effect of legislative-led school finance reform on short-
run outcomes – the author found that the reform was successful in reducing spending disparities 
between school districts and led to significant gains in scores on state tests for the lowest 
spending districts that were the primary beneficiaries of the funding reform.  
In the most recent comprehensive study on school finance reforms, Lafortune, Rothstein, 
and Schanzenbach (2016) studied the impact of court-mandated and legislative reforms from 
1990-2013. Finance reform events led to sustained increases in spending in low-income districts 
with large positive impacts on student achievement – a $1,000 per pupil increase in annual 
spending in a low-income school district led to a 0.18 standard deviation increase in test scores 
10 years later. However, the authors’ findings come with an important caveat: although 
inequities between high and low-income districts were reduced, there was no effect on within-
district academic inequities between high and low-income students. These studies are mostly 
uniform in their finding that school finance reforms led to spending equalization that has positive 
impacts on student achievement. The fact that these studies using rigorous methodologies have 
consistently challenged Hanushek’s findings (1996) re-opens the question about the relationship 
between school resources and student outcomes. Because my study focuses on the impact of 
federal Title I funding, a review of the literature on intergovernmental grants and research on the 
impact of Title I also provides valuable context for my findings.  
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B. Intergovernmental Grants and Title I Funding 
When states and localities receive funding from a higher level of government, there is 
potential that they will supplant the funds, reducing their own spending in response to funding 
received from an external source. However, a large body of evidence seems to confirm the 
“flypaper effect”, which suggests that funding from a higher level of government increases 
spending on a targeted program more than theory would predict (Hines & Thaler, 1995). To the 
contrary, more recent studies have begun to challenge the consensus view on the flypaper effect. 
Knight (2002) found that federal highway grants crowd out state-spending, while Gordon (2004) 
found that exogenous changes in Title I funding caused educational expenditures to increase in 
the short run, but level off over time as a local offsetting response reduced local spending. These 
results suggest that the impact of intergovernmental grants on spending at lower levels of 
government warrants further research.  
A number of studies assess the effect of Title I funding on state and local spending as 
well as student performance. In “Prospects: The Congressionally Mandated Study of Educational 
Growth and Opportunity”, Puma et al. (1993) found that Title I funds did not close the gap in 
student achievement between disadvantaged students and their more advantaged peers. However, 
there are two main methodological issues with these findings. First, it is entirely possible that 
disadvantaged students would have been even worse off and the achievement gap would have 
widened in the absence of the supplementary funds. Borman and D’Agostino’s meta-analysis 
(1996) of 17 studies on the impact of Title I found an overall positive effect of Title I on student 
achievement and that the program improved over time through better enforcement and program 
improvement standards. Although it is unlikely that Title I can eliminate the performance gap 
between high and low-income students, these findings suggest that disadvantaged students would 
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have fallen even further behind in the absence of Title I. Second, the study does not account for a 
potential offsetting effect from state and local governments in response to the receipt of Title I 
funds that may result in no increase in net services for disadvantaged students. Studies on the 
impact of Title I on net revenues and spending have come to differing conclusions. Feldstein 
(1978) found that for each dollar of Title I funds received, local school districts increase their 
spending by 72 cents, suggesting that a substantial portion of the funds are used to increase 
spending. To the contrary, Gordon (2004) found that while Title I initially boosts revenue and 
spending, these results are no longer significant and their effect is reduced three years later 
because of a local offsetting response. These results indicate that the crucial question about 
whether Title I funds increase net revenues and services for disadvantaged students is still open 
for debate.  
A few more recent studies have employed a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to 
assess the impact of exogenous changes in Title I funds. The studies exploit an arbitrary cutoff in 
the Title I distribution formula that allows schools above a certain level of poverty to receive 
Title I funding, while schools below the threshold receive no funding. In a study on Title I in 
New York City, overall spending increased while test scores actually declined for the treatment 
group that received Title I funding (Weinstein, Stiefel, Scwartz, & Chalico, 2009). Van der 
Klaauw (2008) found that although Title I funding increased for the treatment group, it did not 
lead to a net increase in overall spending and had an adverse effect on student achievement. 
Although one study did find some evidence of crowding out of state and local funds, total net 
revenues increased and had no effect on student achievement (Matsudaira, Hosek, & Walsh, 
2012). In sum, two of the three studies found evidence of a net increase in spending, two of the 
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three studies found evidence of crowding out of spending at lower levels of government, and all 
of the studies found either a negative effect or no effect on student achievement.  
Most relevant to my analysis, Gordon (2004) used an IV-2SLS research design to 
estimate the impact of Title I funding on district revenue and spending. Gordon exploits the 
decennial updating of poverty counts in the 1990 U.S. Census, which generated an exogenous 
change in Title I funds when the new poverty counts were first implemented in the 1993 
allocation formula. These exogenous changes in funds instrument for the actual changes in Title 
I funding to estimate the causal effect on revenues and spending. Gordon initially found large, 
positive, statistically significant increases in total revenue and instructional spending in the first 
year, but those effects were reduced substantially and became insignificant as a result of a large, 
negative, statistically significant offsetting effect in local revenue three years after the new 
poverty counts were used. My analysis utilizes a similar methodology to Gordon’s, but I use 
updated poverty counts from the 2010 U.S. Census.   
III. Empirical Approach  
Numerous studies have come to differing conclusions about the impact of Title I, so my 
analysis seeks to address two primary issues: the impact of sudden changes in Title I funding on 
state and local spending as well as the subsequent impact of those shifts in funds on student 
achievement. Fortunately, the discontinuous nature of Title I funding that is the driven by 
changes in poverty counts from the 2010 U.S. Census presents an opportunity to use an IV-2SLS 
research design to more effectively determine a causal relationship in addressing these two issues 
in question. My analysis yields findings that contribute to the public economics literature on 
fiscal federalism and the education economics literature on education production functions. 
Studies have consistently found evidence of the flypaper effect: funds from a higher level of 
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government tend to “stick” to the purpose for which they are allocated (Hines & Thaler, 1995). 
Gordon’s findings (2004) challenge the findings in this literature, and my analysis also reveals 
the deeper complexities about how state and local governments alter their funding patterns for 
education over time in response to exogenous influxes of funds from the federal government. 
I also obtained estimates of the impact of those fiscal effects on student achievement. 
Assessing the effect of these shifts in funds on student performance furthers Gordon’s research, 
which only focuses on revenues and expenditures. An advantage of focusing on Ohio is the 
availability of value-added estimates of school districts’ impacts on student achievement. These 
estimates capture student learning growth and effectively control for student characteristics, 
providing a superior measure of district performance than that used in prior studies. Chetty, 
Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) found that value-added scores provide unbiased estimates of 
teachers’ causal impacts on student performance, so the use of this data is a significant 
improvement on previous literature on the relationship between school funding and student 
outcomes that does not utilize value-added student achievement data. 
A. Data  
This study uses district-level panel data from 2010-2015 for over 600 Ohio school 
districts. The Ohio Department of Education provides publicly available data on over 50 
variables in District Profile Reports. The data include basic revenue and expenditure 
measurements; important measures of student characteristics, including percentage of 
economically disadvantaged students; and measures of real resource variables such as average 
teacher salary and teacher experience. Data on value-added test scores for each Ohio school 
district were also obtained from the Ohio Department of Education. Value-added measures 
student learning gains for each district in a given year by accounting for multiple years of prior 
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student test scores, thereby accounting for differences in characteristics between students (Ohio 
Department of Education, 2014).  
Title I poverty and allocation data for 2010-2015 were obtained from the National Center 
for Education Statistics (NCES). Title I funding is dependent on a given state or district’s 
eligibility count, defined as the number of students in poverty. The eligibility count is the 
number of children, aged 5-17, who live in: 
1. Families with income at or below the poverty level (Department of Commerce) 
2. Families with incomes above the poverty level, but who receive Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) 
3. Institutions for neglected or delinquent children  
4. Foster homes in which the parents receive government payments for the child’s 
support 
 
NCES records the poverty counts, enrollment, and allocations for Ohio school districts for the 
four Title I grant formulas: Basic, Concentration, Targeted, and Education Finance Incentive 
Grants (Sonnenberg & Provasnik, 2007). 
B. Identification Strategy 
 A standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model would assess the impact of changes in 
Title I funding on changes in a particular outcome of interest to assess whether Title I exhibits 
flypaper properties. Consider this basic OLS specification: 
(1) ΔYdt = β0 + β1ΔActualTitleIdt + µdt  
where d indexes districts and t indexes time. ΔYdt is the one year change in an outcome, 
ΔActualTitleIdt is the actual one year change in Title I funds, and µdt is the random error term. 
However, this OLS specification suffers from omitted variable bias and violates one of the basic 
assumptions of the model – that the independent variable is uncorrelated with the error term. 
Poverty counts are the primary factor determining Title I allocations, and district poverty level 
also has a substantial effect on several outcome variables, particularly student achievement. Thus 
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a research design that exploits exogenous changes in Title I funding is required to obtain casual 
estimates for the outcomes of interest.  
 My identification strategy essentially replicates Gordon’s method (2004), but I use 
updated poverty data from the 2010 Census to assess the causal effect of sudden changes in Title 
I funds on revenues, spending, and academic outcomes for Ohio school districts in the 2012-
2014 school years. Although NCES now approximates district poverty counts from year to year 
instead of using poverty counts dating all the way back to the 2000 Census, there was still a 
significant shift in poverty and funding for many districts when the new data were first used in 
the Title I allocation formulas in 2012-13 (or FY 13). With the use of updated data, reported 
poverty counts jumped discretely, while actual poverty rates and state and local revenues that 
depend on poverty changed continuously. Most other revenue and spending is related to district 
property wealth, which varies continuously and is unlikely to have a discrete jump at the same 
time as the sudden change in Title I funding driven by Census-updating. Sudden shifts in poverty 
counts generated by decennial updating of the U.S. Census in 2010 subsequently drive 
substantial exogenous changes in Title I funding.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the distribution of the change in Title I funding per pupil for 
2011-12 (before Census-updating) and 2012-13 (after Census-updating). Although the change at 
the mean is less than $20 per pupil, the changes at the tails of the distribution are much larger 
and impactful. The changes in funding were greater in 2012-13 than in 2011-12, and the 
disparity between the 2012-13 change and the 2011-12 change is greatest at the tails of the 
distribution. These changes in funds provide the variation needed for the IV method I utilize for 
my analysis.  
 
15 
 
C. Creating the Instrument 
 To isolate the Census-driven changes in Title I funding, I used a two-step simulation 
process: 
1. Calculated what the Title I allocation for FY 13 would have been had the Census not 
been updated  
2. Subtracted the FY 13 predicted allocation for Title I from the FY 13 actual allocation for 
Title I to obtain the exogenous change in Title I funds for that year  
 
For this simulation process, I ultimately decided to use the allocations for just the Basic and 
Concentration Grants. The allocation formulas for these grants are much more straightforward 
and easier to replicate since funding is awarded based primarily on the eligibility count (denoted 
PoorYear) and state per pupil expenditure (denoted SPPEYear), while the formulas for the Targeted 
and EFIG Grants are much more complicated and provide increasingly more funding per student 
as the poverty rate increases across districts. Also, the Basic and Concentration Grants still 
account for a majority of Title I funding, so using just these two grants provides substantial 
variation in funding to generate the IV.  
PoorYear and SPPEYear are the main factors that determine simulated allocations for the 
Basic and Concentration Grants.  In the first step of the simulation, I used the formula that NCES 
employs to calculate SPPEYear: 
(2) (Eligibility Count)*(Adjusted SPPE) = Allocation Amount 
For example, I divided Allocation2013 by Poor2013 to obtain SPPE2013. I then used SPPE2013 and 
multiplied it by Poor2012 to obtain the FY 13 predicted allocation – this calculation uses FY 12 
poverty counts and FY 13 SPPE to determine what the FY 13 allocation would have been had 
the Census poverty counts not been updated, holding SPPE constant. I then used simple 
differencing methods, as described in step two, to obtain the exogenous change in Title I funds. 
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This simulation method is detailed with the following equations. The simulated variable is the 
Census-determined change in Title I per pupil: 
(3) 
𝑇𝐼2013(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2013,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2013)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2013
 - 
𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2012,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2013)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2012
 
The change in (3) serves as an IV for the actual change in Title I funds for all four grants:  
 
(4) 
𝑇𝐼2013(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2013,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2013)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2013
 - 
𝑇𝐼2012(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2012,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2012)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2012
 
 
These variables are used to obtain estimates for outcomes that are also based on a change from 
FY 12 to FY 13. For the two-year change, the simulated variable for the Census-determined 
change in Title I: 
(5) 
𝑇𝐼2014(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2014,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2014)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2014
 - 
𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2012,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2014)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2012
 
 
The change in (5) serves as an IV for the actual change in Title I funds for all four grants: 
 
(6) 
𝑇𝐼2014(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2014,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2014)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2014
 - 
𝑇𝐼2012(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2012,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2012)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2012
 
 
These variables are used to obtain estimates for outcomes that are also based on a change from 
FY 12 to FY 14. However, attempting to calculate the exogenous change in funding from 2012-
14 introduces measurement error in the IV because the exogenous change occurs just when new 
Census poverty counts were implemented in FY 13. In an effort to deal with this methodological 
issue, I also use the FY 13 exogenous change in Title I funds to instrument for the actual change 
in Title I funds. I estimate models using the IV in both equation 5 (see Table 3, column 4) and 
equation 7 (see Table 3, column 2) for comparison, but the discussion of my results focuses on 
the estimates using the IV in equation 7 since it reduces measurement error:  
(7) 
𝑇𝐼2013(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2013,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2013)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2013
 - 
𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2012,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2013)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2012
 
 
The change in (7) serves as an IV for the actual change in Title I for all four grants: 
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(8) 
𝑇𝐼2014(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2014,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2014)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2014
 - 
𝑇𝐼2012(𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟2012,𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐸2012)
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2012
 
 
These variables are used to obtain estimates for outcomes that are also based on a change from 
FY 12 to FY 14.  
 It is important to note that there are two aspects of the Basic and Concentration Grant 
distribution formulas that may introduce some measurement error in the simulation method I 
employ. The hold-harmless clause ensures that districts do not incur exceedingly large losses of 
funding compared to the previous year as a result of large drops in eligibility counts. Although 
the hold-harmless may limit drastic losses in funding for districts with declining eligibility 
counts with the new Census data, the IV still generates adequate variation for my analysis. The 
Small State Minimum also ensures that no state should receive less than a minimum threshold of 
funding (Sonnenberg & Provasnik, 2007), but since my analysis is limited to the state of Ohio, it 
seems unlikely that this factor would drive significant differences between districts within the 
state.  
D. Instrumental Variables – Two-Stage Least Squares Research Design 
The analysis uses the simulated funding changes calculated above as IVs in 2SLS 
statistical models. I use the calculated exogenous changes in Title I funds to predict actual 
changes in Title I funds in the following first-stage model: 
(9) ΔActualTitleIdt = β0 + β1ΔExogTitleIdt + µdt  
ΔActualTitleIdt is the actual change in Title I funds, ΔExogTitleIdt is the calculated change in 
Title I funds due to changes in the 2010 Census, and µdt is the random error term. I then use the 
change in funding predicted by the first-stage result in my second-stage model: 
(10) ΔYdt = β0 + β1ΔActualTitleIdt + β2lagΔState Revenuedt-1 + β3lagΔState Revenuedt-2 
+ β4lagΔLocalRevenuedt-1 + β5lagΔLocal Revenuedt-2 + µdt 
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where ΔYdt is the change in outcome, ΔActualTitleIdt is the change in funding predicted by the 
first-stage result, and the model includes controls for lagged one year changes in revenue per 
pupil in FY 11 and FY 12, the years immediately preceding the use of new poverty counts.4 All 
outcome and explanatory variables are based on per pupil measurements. The analysis estimates 
the above models across a number of outcomes, including the impact of Title I funds on revenue 
variables including total, state, local, and federal revenue; expenditure variables, including total 
expenditure and instructional expenditure; and student achievement variables, including value-
added gain and the performance index.5 I estimate these models for both the one year change 
from FY 12 to FY 13 and the two year change from FY 12 to FY 14.  
IV. Results 
 I consider both short-term (one year change) and long-term (two year change) responses 
to exogenous changes in Title I funds to test the flypaper effect over time. First, I discuss quality 
of the calculated instrument as a predictor for Title I based on first-stage results. Second, I 
examine both the short and long-run impacts of Title I from the second stage results, and my 
discussion focuses primarily on columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 since those are the columns that use 
the IV for FY 13. Third, I compare my IV-2SLS estimates to OLS estimates. Finally, I discuss 
results from specification tests on pre-period outcomes to justify the use of my IV as an 
exogenous source of Title I funding.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Gordon (2004) also controls for enrollment changes in her second-stage specification. I provide results of a model 
that controls for enrollment changes in Table 6, which shows that the sign and significance of the estimates 
correspond closely to the results provided in Table 3 based on the specification in equation (10).  
5 Descriptive statistics for variables from both the Ohio Department of Education and NCES are provided in Tables 
7 and 8. 
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A. First-Stage Results 
Table 2 shows my first-stage results, and it is clear that the simulated change in Title I 
funds is a strong predictor for the actual change in Title I funds for both the one and two year 
changes. In column 1, the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 13 serves as the dependent 
variable, while the simulated change in Title I for the same time period serves as the independent 
variable for the regression. The coefficient for the calculated change is 1.19, so a $1 increase in 
simulated exogenous changes in Title I leads to a $1.19 increase in the actual changes in Title I 
funds. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic is also large with a 
value of 814.29, and the R-squared value of 0.57 shows that the simulated change explains a 
large proportion of the actual change. In column 2, the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 
14 serves as the dependent variable, while the simulated change in Title I for the same time 
period serves as the independent variable for the regression. The coefficient for the simulated 
change is 1.39, which means a $1 increase in exogenous changes in Title I funds translates to a 
$1.39 increase in the actual changes in Title I funds. This estimate is also statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Similar values for the F-statistic and R-squared are obtained for this result as 
well. With a coefficient greater than one that is statistically significant and a large R-squared 
value in both cases, the IV has strong predictive power.  
B. Second-Stage Results: Short-Term Responses to Title I 
The second-stage results indicate that initially Title I funds stick to the purpose for which 
they are intended. I emphasize focusing on the direction and significance of the coefficients 
rather than strict interpretation of the results because of inherent measurement error in the 
analysis.  In column 1 of Table 3, I report estimates of the impact of Census-induced changes in 
Title I on the outcomes of interest. A $1 dollar increase in Title I translates into more than a $2 
20 
 
increase in total revenue, a $1.75 increase in state revenue, and a $0.85 increase in federal 
revenue. Considering the revenue results for column 1 of Table 3, when the coefficients for state, 
local, and federal revenue are added, they sum perfectly to the coefficient for total revenue, 
which suggests that the results are sensible. The large and positive result for state revenue 
warrants further attention. The state of Ohio has made numerous changes to the state funding 
formula in the last five years, so the result may be a reflection of the state pushing greater 
funding to low property wealth districts that are the same beneficiaries of sudden increases in 
Title I funding. It may be the case that the state incorporates Census data into its allocation 
formula, but this information is not well documented.  
I also find smaller, positive, statistically insignificant effects for local revenue, total 
expenditures, and instructional expenditures. Although the results for expenditures are not 
significant, the direction of the coefficients indicates that increases in total and state revenue 
translate to increases in instructional expenditures. This creates the opportunity to provide 
supplemental support to low-income students through classroom aides, tutoring, and a variety of 
other instructional interventions schools can take with increased discretional spending. However, 
there is also a very small, negative, statistically significant effect for the performance index, but 
the effect is so small that it is unlikely to be large enough in magnitude to have any substantial 
impact on student learning. Essentially Census-driven changes in Title I have little to no impact 
on student performance in the short-term. This finding is unsurprising when the magnitude of 
and the time period for the change in Title I funding is considered. The descriptive statistics in 
Table 8 reveal that for the exogenous and actual change in Title I funds, the average change is 
less than $20 per pupil, and even for the districts that gain or lose the most funding, the change in 
funds is rarely more than a few hundred dollars per pupil. This change in funding pales in 
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comparison to the magnitude of the spending change considered in other studies. For example, 
Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2014) assess the effect of a 20 percent increase in per-pupil 
spending and Lafortunte, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2016) evaluate the impact of a $1,000 
increase in per-pupil spending. Furthermore, both studies consider the effect of these spending 
increases over the course of a decade or more. The Title I funding change driven by Census-
updating is unlikely to be economically significant enough to have a dramatic impact on 
schooling outcomes, especially over such a short period of time.  
C. Second-Stage Results: Long-Term Responses to Title I  
Although I initially find results indicative of flypaper properties, the estimates in column 
2 of Table 3 reveal that the positive effects for total and state revenue are reduced for the two 
year change and there is a negative local offsetting effect. The Census-induced change in Title I 
results in a $0.55 increase in total revenue, $1.15 increase in state revenue, $0.53 decrease in 
local revenue, and a $0.59 increase in federal revenue. Only the results for state and federal 
revenue are significant. For expenditures, the positive effect of total expenditures is reduced, 
while the estimate for instructional expenditures becomes negative. These estimates indicate that 
offsetting effects in revenue may translate to offsetting effects in expenditures and result in 
reduced instructional spending. The size of the negative effect for the performance index nearly 
doubles in size and is statistically different from zero, which may indicate that losses in revenues 
and instructional expenditures translate to slight negative effects on student achievement. 
Overall, the short-run impact of sudden changes in Title I funds results in revenue and 
expenditure increases, confirming the flypaper effect; however, over time, the positive effects for 
revenue are reduced and there is a negative local offsetting response that has adverse impacts on 
instructional spending and student achievement.  
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I also provide alternative sets of estimates for the two year change based on different 
specifications. In column 4 of Table 3, the FY 14 IV is used for the actual change in Title I from 
FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes from FY 12 to FY 14. In column 
3, both the FY 13 and FY 14 IVs are used to instrument for the actual change in Title I from FY 
12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes from FY 12 to FY 14. I focused the 
discussion of my results on the estimates in column 2 because that IV most closely captures the 
exogenous shock in funding from FY 12 to FY 13, but I also wanted to provide estimates based 
on the simulated exogenous change in funding from FY 12 to FY 14 since the IV is used for 
actual changes in funding from FY 12 to FY 14. However, the result for federal revenue in 
column 4 calls into question the use of the FY 14 IV. A $1 increase in Title I translates to just a 
$0.19 increase in federal revenue when Title I accounts for a majority of federal funding, and the 
result is not statistically significant. I also find a large, negative effect for local revenue as well 
as a positive effect for state revenue, and both of these results are significant. When the IVs for 
the exogenous change from FY 12 to FY 13 and FY 12 to FY 14 are both used (in column 3), I 
find that the estimates are approximately midway between the estimates for specifications in 
which just one IV is used (in columns 2 and 4). The results suggest that simulating the 
exogenous change in funding from FY 12 to FY 14 introduces measurement error in the IV since 
no exogenous change in funding occurs from FY 13 to FY 14.  
D. OLS Results 
 Table 4 shows the OLS estimates. The direction of the effect is the same as the IV 
estimates except for the one year change for local revenue and the two year change for total 
expenditure (neither of these variables is significant for both the IV and OLS estimates). The size 
of the effects is also similar in most cases. Generally the OLS estimates indicate that sudden 
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changes in Title I initially increase revenues and spending, but lead to a negative offsetting effect 
in local revenue that translates to a negative effect for instructional expenditures.  
E. Specification Tests 
 To justify the use of my IV, I employ specification tests that provide evidence that the 
coefficients from my IV-2SLS analysis can be interpreted as causal estimates. Through my 
specification tests, I consider the impact of the changes in Title I per pupil from FY 12 to FY 13 
on changes in the outcome variables from FY 11 to FY 12 (before Census-updating). Table 5 
shows that the exogenous change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 13 has no effect on pre-period 
changes in revenue, expenditures, and student achievement. The standard errors indicate that not 
a single estimate is statistically different from zero. The specification tests suggest that the use of 
the IV as an exogenous source of funding is legitimate.  
V. Conclusions 
This paper finds evidence of typical flypaper properties initially, with both total and state 
revenue increasing with changes in Title I, but in the long-run a negative local offsetting 
response results in a reduction in the positive effect for total revenue and a negative effect for 
instructional expenditures. I also find a slight, statistically significant, negative effect for the 
performance index for both the short and long-term changes in Title I, but the effect is so small it 
is unlikely to have a substantial academic effect. The effect for value-added gain is 
insignificantly different from zero.  
These results advance the pubic economics literature on the flypaper effect. By 
considering both one and two year changes in funding, I am able to assess the “stickiness” of 
Title I over time. In the first year, there appears to be significant crowd-in with Title I, with a 
dollar increase in Title I translating into more than a dollar increase in both total and state 
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revenue. However, the two year change in funding has a negative impact on local revenue and 
the impact on total revenue becomes insignificantly different from zero, providing some 
evidence of crowd-out. It may seem surprising that there is evidence of an offsetting response in 
just two years, but Ohio’s system of school funding may establish circumstances for an offsetting 
response to be realistic in a fairly short time period. Voters routinely face levies on the ballot 
every year, 6 and a local school board could act on information about a sudden increase or 
decrease in Title I funds to determine if a levy should be proposed.  
Curiously, there is still significant crowd-in for state revenue for the two year change. A 
potential explanation for this finding is that this may reflect greater effort by the state of Ohio to 
push higher levels of funding to the same districts that gained from Census-induced changes in 
Title I funds. For example, the state passed new budgets in 2011 and 2013 that revised the state 
school funding formula. The 2011 budget repealed the Evidence-Based Model and put Bridge 
Funding in place. Bridge Funding provided allocations to districts based on their per pupil 
funding for FY 11, adjusted and indexed by relative tax valuation per pupil, which is a reflection 
of district property wealth. The state was also required to provide supplemental funding to make 
up for the loss of federal stimulus funding (Parker & Cummiskey, 2011). The state passed a new 
budget again in 2013, creating a new weighted student funding formula that provides funding 
based on a state share index related to district property wealth and median income (Parker & 
Cummiskey, 2013). The positive effects for state revenue may be a reflection of legislative 
changes that provide increasingly more funding to low property wealth districts, the same 
                                                          
6 “Administrators Blame Ohio’s School Funding Model For Levies”. (2011, November 4). NPR StateImpact. 
Retreived from http://www.ideastream.org/stateimpact/2011/11/04/administrators-blame-ohios-school-funding-
model-for-levies.  
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districts likely experiencing large gains in Title I funds. The responses of both state and local 
governments over time provide valuable information about the flypaper effect.  
 The findings of this paper also have broader implications for the education economics 
literature on education production functions by exploring the impact of Title I on student 
performance. Although the results for expenditures were initially positive, the two year change in 
funds induced a reduction in instructional expenditures. Title I had either a slight negative or no 
effect on student achievement. In the long-run, the results suggest that it seems unlikely that Title 
I ensures a net service increase for low-income students, which defeats the intended purpose of 
the program of providing greater resources for districts with higher proportions of disadvantaged 
students. The failure to increase net services may partially explain why Title I does not have a 
substantial or significant impact on student achievement. Still the achievement results reveal that 
districts that received exogenous changes in Title I funds were not able to improve student 
performance, which raises the question of whether the most effective interventions are being 
used with the flexible use of Title I funds.  
 Although my analysis sheds some light on the effect of Title I on student outcomes, there 
is still considerable room for more research. Further research should explore how exogenous 
changes in Title I funds affect these outcomes over a longer period of time because it may take 
several years before drastic changes in funding have a substantial impact on student outcomes. 
Performing analysis that assesses how Title I funds are allocated to schools within a district as 
well as whether the funds are used for interventions that directly target the neediest students 
within schools could also reveal important findings. Providing policymakers with information on 
these issues will be imperative to ensuring efficient and effective use of federal education dollars 
targeted to help low-income students. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Distribution of Changes in Actual Title I Funds Per Pupil, 2011-12 and 2012-2013 
 Change in Title I Funds, FY 2011-12 Change in Title I Funds, FY 2012-13 
1st -38 -77 
5th -23 -42 
10th -15 -28 
25th -4 -8 
50th 10 9 
75th 30 38 
90th 55 73 
95th 68 104 
99th 107 170 
Mean 16 19 
Standard 
deviation 
29 52 
N 609 609 
Note: the changes in Title I funds are in dollar amounts and the distribution ranges from the 1st to the 99th 
percentile. 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics Title I Allocations, 2015.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Note: the changes in Title I funds are in dollar amounts and the distribution ranges from the 1st to the 99th 
percentile. 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics Title I Allocations, 2015.  
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Table 2 
First-stage results: correlations between simulated exogenous changes in Title I and actual changes in Title I 
revenue per pupil 
Outcomes  (1) (2) 
 1 year change 
(2012-13) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
Actual Title I 1.190*** 1.393*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0495) 
   
F 814.29 793.73 
 
R-Squared 0.5729 0.5667 
 
N 
 
609 
 
609 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standards errors are in parentheses. 
All regressions control for district-level changes in state and local revenue per pupil from 2010-2012, but are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of these controls. 
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Table 3 
IV estimates of effects of changes in Title I funds per pupil on changes in revenue and expenditure per pupil, 
value-added gain, and the performance index  
Outcomes  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1 year change 
(2012-13) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
Total Revenue 2.761*** 1.210 0.595 0.0365 
 (0.827) (1.060) (0.995) (1.049) 
     
State Revenue 1.753*** 1.148* 1.185** 1.218* 
 (0.498) (0.632) (0.594) (0.625) 
 
Local Revenue 0.159 -0.525 -0.968 -1.370** 
 (0.572) (0.660) (0.620) (0.654) 
     
Federal Revenue 0.850*** 0.587*** 0.378** 0.189 
 (0.182) (0.185) (0.173) (0.181) 
     
Total  0.420 0.273 -0.121 -0.479 
Expenditure (0.745) (1.011) (0.950) (1.001) 
     
Instructional  0.333 -0.0802 -0.415 -0.719 
Expenditure (0.465) (0.578) (0.543) (0.572) 
     
Gain 0.00107 0.0000243 0.000772 0.00145 
 (0.00181) (0.00169) (0.00159) (0.00167) 
     
Performance -0.00246* -0.00428** -0.00402** -0.00378** 
Index (0.00140) (0.00168) (0.00158) (0.00166) 
 
N 
 
608 
 
608 
 
608 
 
608 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standard errors are in parentheses.  
Each cell in the table represents its own regression. New poverty data from the 2010 Census was first used in 2012-
13 (or FY 13). Calculated changes in Title I instrument for actual changes in Title I. All regressions control for 
district-level changes in state and local revenue per pupil from 2010-2012. In column (1), the FY 13 IV is used for 
the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 13 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes for FY 13. In 
column (2), the FY 13 IV is used for the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the 
change in outcomes from FY 12 to FY 14. In column (4), the FY 14 IV is used for the actual change in Title I from 
FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes from FY 12 to FY 14. In column (3), both the FY 13 
and FY 14 IVs are used for the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the change in 
outcomes from FY 12 to FY 14. OLS results for these specifications are in Table 4.  
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Table 4 
OLS estimates of effects of changes in Title I per pupil on changes in revenue and expenditure per pupil, 
value-added gain, and the performance index  
Outcomes  (1) (2) 
 1-year change, 
2012-2013  
2-year change, 
2012-2014 
Total Revenue 2.322*** 0.449 
 (0.634) (0.792) 
   
State Revenue 2.147*** 1.012** 
 (0.382) (0.472) 
 
Local Revenue -0.361 -0.696 
 (0.439) (0.493) 
   
Federal Revenue 0.535*** 0.133 
 (0.139) (0.137) 
   
Total  0.524 -0.00482 
Expenditure (0.572) (0.756) 
   
Instructional  0.342 -0.446 
Expenditure (0.357) (0.432) 
   
Gain 0.00218 0.00181 
 (0.00139) (0.00126) 
   
Performance -0.00124 -0.00141 
Index (0.00108) (0.00125) 
 
N 
 
608 
 
608 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standards errors are in parentheses. 
Each cell in the table represents its own regression. New poverty data from the 2010 Census was first used in 2012-
2013 (or FY 2013). All regressions control for district-level changes in state and local revenue per pupil from 2010-
2012.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 5 
IV estimates of effects of changes in Title I per pupil (2012-13) on earlier (2011-12) changes in revenue and 
expenditure per pupil, value-added gain, and the performance index 
Outcomes  (1) 
 Pre-period 
change 
Total Revenue 0.148 
 (0.601) 
  
State Revenue -0.0919 
 (0.362) 
 
Local Revenue 0.223 
 (0.389) 
  
Federal Revenue 0.0172 
 (0.189) 
  
Total  0.215 
Expenditure (0.742) 
  
Instructional  -0.0408 
Expenditure (0.434) 
  
Gain 0.000618 
 (0.00170) 
  
Performance 0.00147 
Index (0.00151) 
 
N 
 
609 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standard errors are in parentheses.  
Each cell in the table represents its own regression. New poverty data from the 2010 Census was first used in 2012-
13 (or FY 13). Calculated changes in Title I for FY 13 instrument for actual changes in Title I for FY 13, and IV-
2SLS is used to estimate the impact on the change in outcomes from FY 11 to FY 12, referred to as the pre-period 
change.  
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Table 6 
IV estimates of effects of change in Title I funds per pupil on changes in revenue and expenditure per pupil, 
value-added gain, and the performance index, with controls for enrollment changes  
Outcomes  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1 year change 
(2012-13) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
2 year change 
(2012-2014) 
Total Revenue 2.138*** 1.190 0.557 -0.0261 
 (0.822) (1.071) (1.006) (1.062) 
     
State Revenue 1.115** 1.128* 1.158* 1.186* 
 (0.467) (0.639) (0.600) (0.633) 
 
Local Revenue 0.209 -0.555 -1.016 -1.441** 
 (0.587) (0.667) (0.627) (0.662) 
     
Federal Revenue 0.813*** 0.617*** 0.415** 0.229 
 (0.186) (0.187) (0.174) (0.183) 
     
Total  0.447 0.356 -0.0167 -0.360 
Expenditure (0.765) (1.021) (0.960) (1.012) 
     
Instructional  0.329 -0.0488 -0.379 -0.683 
Expenditure (0.477) (0.584) (0.549) (0.579) 
     
Gain 0.000986 -0.000249 0.000418 0.00103 
 (0.00186) (0.00171) (0.00160) (0.00169) 
     
Performance -0.00238* -0.00428** -0.00401** -0.00375** 
Index (0.00144) (0.00170) (0.00159) (0.00168) 
 
N 
 
608 
 
608 
 
608 
 
608 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standard errors are in parentheses.  
Each cell in the table represents its own regression. New poverty data from the 2010 Census was first used in 2012-
13 (or FY 13). Calculated changes in Title I instrument for actual changes in Title I. All regressions control for 
district-level changes in state and local revenue per pupil from 2010-2012 as well as enrollment changes (2012-13 
for the 1 year change, 2013-14 for the 2 year change). In column (1), the FY 13 IV is used for the actual change in 
Title I from FY 12 to FY 13 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes for FY 13. In column (2), the FY 13 IV 
is used for the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes from FY 
12 to FY 14. In column (4), the FY 14 IV is used for the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the 
impact on the change in outcomes from FY 12 to FY 14. In column (3), both the FY 13 and FY 14 IVs are used for 
the actual change in Title I from FY 12 to FY 14 to assess the impact on the change in outcomes from FY 12 to FY 
14.  
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for enrollment, Title I allocations, and outcome variables, including revenues, 
expenditures, and student achievement for 2012  
Variables Mean 
 (Standard 
Deviation) 
Total Children 3242.320 
 (6006.637) 
  
Average Daily 
Membership 
2881.332  
(4829.567) 
  
Title I Revenue 212.990  
(148.432) 
  
Basic and Concentration 
Revenue 
132.0358 
(78.489) 
  
Total Revenue 10282.180 
 (2010.946) 
  
State Revenue 4770.588 
 (1423.497) 
  
Local Revenue 4727.094 
 (2184.860) 
  
Federal Revenue 784.499 
 
 
Total Expenditure 
 
 
Instructional Expenditure  
 
 
Gain 
 
 
Performance Index 
 
 
N 
(425.282) 
 
9938.926 
(1932.808) 
 
5514.924 
(1037.807) 
 
.397 
(1.294) 
 
99.135 
(6.056) 
 
609 
  
Revenue and expenditure variables are based on per pupil measurements. Total Children is the number of children, 
aged 5-17, who reside in the district, and this data was obtained along with Title I allocation data from NCES. 
Average Daily Membership is the total number of public school students residing within a district’s boundaries, and 
this data was obtained from the CUPP Reports provided by the Ohio Department of Education. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics for exogenous and actual changes in Title I funding per pupil for 2013  
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum 
 (Standard 
Deviation) 
  
Exogenous 14.169 137.088 -334.323 
Change in Title I (33.242)   
    
Actual Change in 
Title I 
19.274 
(52.274) 
541.630 -158.670 
 
N 
 
609 
 
609 
 
609 
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